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An increasing number of states have passed legislation legalizing medi-
cal and recreational marijuana.  This Note provides a survey of the language
utilized by these states in their legislation and legislative materials, searching
for and highlighting those purposes and intentions of the states, which impli-
cate, explicitly or implicitly, federalism.  Through this survey of mostly pri-
mary source materials, various trends and similarities among the materials
will be apparent, and this Note will provide a useful resource for those trying
to understand why the states may have enacted these laws.
The Note proceeds in four Parts.  Part I provides information on the
current legal landscape surrounding marijuana and its regulation as a con-
trolled substance, briefly exploring the federal position on marijuana to pro-
vide necessary context for the actions of the states.  Part II explores the state
legislation and materials related to medical marijuana legalization, examin-
ing and surveying the primary source material from many states.  Part III
explores state legislation and materials related to recreational marijuana leg-
islation in a similar way.  Part IV takes a brief glance at a historical issue,
which presented a conflict between state and federal law, and provides tenta-
tive suggestions for why marijuana legalization might be unique.  Through-
out, this Note puts forward propositions regarding why states may have
included particular language, also noting when explicit and implicit federal-
ism arguments could be at work.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.A., History,
Villanova University, 2013.  I would like to thank Professor A.J. Bellia for his guidance and
assistance throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank the staff of the Notre
Dame Law Review for their edits and revisions.  All errors are my own.
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I. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA)1 was enacted in 1970 by Congress
as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.2  In
the CSA, Congress declared that while many “drugs included within this sub-
chapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to
maintain the health and general welfare of the American people,” it was
nonetheless true that “[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution,
and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial
and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American
people.”3  To further this purpose, the CSA created a classification system
comprised of five “schedules,” designated I, II, III, IV, and V.4  Schedule I
substances are those considered to have no accepted medical use and high
potential for abuse.5  Schedules II through V have increasing levels of
accepted medical use and decreasing potential for abuse.6  The Attorney
General is charged with applying the provisions of the CSA to the controlled
substances and is also able to add or alter the scheduling of any controlled
substance.7  For the purposes of this Note, what is most relevant is that mari-
juana was placed in Schedule I,8 and since that time has been considered by
the federal government to have no accepted medical uses, a high potential
for abuse, and a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.
B. State Action
Beginning with California in 1996,9 numerous states have passed their
own measures legalizing the medical use of marijuana, and recently recrea-
tional use as well.  Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
have laws permitting the medical use of marijuana,10 and Washington,11 Col-
1 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at titles 18, 21 26, 31, 40, 42, 46,
48, and 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
3 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)–(2).
4 Id. § 812.
5 Id. § 812(b)(1).
6 See id. §§ 812(b)(2)–(5).
7 See id. § 811(a).  It should be noted that federal rulemaking proceedings to change
the schedule of the drug can be “initiated by the DEA, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), or by petition by any interested person.” TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T.
YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2014) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)).
8 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10).
9 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2014).
10 See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct.16,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx#2.  The
states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washing-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL310.txt unknown Seq: 3 31-MAR-16 9:53
2016] federalism  and  state  marijuana  legislation 1255
orado,12 Alaska,13 Oregon,14 and the District of Columbia15 passed laws
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana.  The states have offered various
reasons for the passage of these laws, and federalism has explicitly and
implicitly been among them.
While the Supreme Court in recent years has discussed the importance
of federalism in numerous cases, in 2005 Gonzales v. Raich16 dealt with Con-
gress’s ability to prohibit the cultivation, possession, or use of medical mari-
juana pursuant to the Commerce Clause as part of the regulatory scheme of
the CSA.  California’s Compassionate Use Act permitted such conduct.17
The Court ultimately decided Congress could regulate this conduct,18 but
statements from amicus briefs, submitted by various states, are illustrative of
some federalism arguments made by the states.  Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi submitted one brief, and California, Maryland, and Washington
another, but both asserted this area of regulation was one within the States’
“police power” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.19
Although Congress’s ability to regulate this type of local conduct under the
CSA was made clear by the Court, this decision stopped neither the passage
of numerous medical marijuana laws since 2005, nor the passage of laws
legalizing recreational marijuana.
ton, with the District of Columbia also permitting medical usage. Id.  Alabama, Florida,
Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
and Wisconsin currently permit limited access to marijuana products with low THC and
high cannabidiol.
11 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401(3) (West 2015).
12 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
13 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.38.010 (West 2015).
14 See Measure 91 (Or. 2014).  The ballot measure has yet to be codified, but there is a
House Bill that will amend and add to relevant sections of the Oregon Revised Code. See
H.B. 3400, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
15 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-904.01 (West 2015).
16 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
17 See id. at 5–6.
18 See id. at 22.
19 See Brief for the States of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Supporting Respon-
dents, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336486, at 10–11 [hereinafter
Amicus Brief of Alabama et al.] (“This case arises against the backdrop of the States’
unquestioned ‘police power’ to make and enforce laws protecting the health, safety, wel-
fare, and morals of their citizens.  Indeed, of the ‘numerous’ powers reserved to the States
under the Constitution, one of the most fundamental is the power to define and punish
criminal conduct. . . . [I]n our federalist system, a State has the right to set its own criminal
policy free of congressional interference.”); Brief of the States of California et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL
2336549, at 6 (“The federal government has limited authority to interfere with State legisla-
tion enacted for the protection of citizen health, safety, and welfare. . . . And it cannot
reasonably be doubted the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and histori-
cally a matter of state concern.” (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996))).
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C. Current Department of Justice Policy
There has not been another Supreme Court decision on the issue since
Raich, but important statements of federal policy have been issued by the
Department of Justice in a series of memoranda, the most recent of which
was issued on August 29, 2013.20  The Department of Justice acknowledged
in this memorandum that “Congress has determined that marijuana is a dan-
gerous drug and that the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a serious
crime. . . . [and the] Department of Justice is committed to enforcement of
the CSA consistent with those determinations.”21  However, the memoran-
dum recognized the Department of Justice has limited resources.  For the
purpose of utilizing its resources in the most efficient way, the memorandum
lists enforcement priorities which are “particularly important to the federal
government,”22 and thus more likely to encourage the federal government to
intervene.
It is also made clear that there is an expectation that states which have
authorized the use of marijuana will effectively regulate the practice,23 and
there is a greater chance the federal government will intervene if the state
actions are deemed ineffective.24  The August 2013 memorandum does
depart slightly from the previous memoranda in that it extends the recom-
mended exercise of prosecutorial discretion to instances of recreational and
commercial marijuana use and production, beyond instances of medical
20 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United States
Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756
857467.pdf.  The other two memoranda were issued in October 2009, Memorandum from
Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden, to Selected United States Attorneys, (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana
.pdf, and June 2011, Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United
States Attorneys (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/
2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
21 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United States Attor-
neys, at 1 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756
857467.pdf.
22 Id.  These enforcement priorities include preventing the following: distribution of
marijuana to minors, revenue from marijuana sales going to criminal organizations, mari-
juana being diverted interstate, connected violence and use of firearms, drugged driving,
public health consequences, marijuana production on public lands, and possession or use
of marijuana on federal property. See id.
23 See id. at 2 (“The Department’s guidance . . . rests on its expectation that states . . .
will implement strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems that will address
the threat those state laws could pose to public safety, public health, and other law enforce-
ment interests.  A system adequate to that task must not only contain robust controls and
procedures on paper; it must also be effective in practice.”).
24 See id. at 3 (“If state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust to protect against
the harms set forth above, the federal government may seek to challenge the regulatory
structure itself in addition to continuing to bring individual enforcement actions, includ-
ing criminal prosecutions, focused on those harms.”).
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use.25  As with previous memoranda on marijuana, this memorandum dis-
claimed any provision of a legal defense to violations of federal law and
emphasized that while investigation and prosecution are most likely in those
situations which implicate one of the enforcement priorities listed previously,
it is not an exhaustive or exclusive listing.26
D. Preemption
With these state laws appearing at first glance to potentially conflict with
federal law, the possibility of preemption being used to challenge them is a
possibility.  There are currently three main types of preemption: express pre-
emption, conflict preemption, and field preemption, all of which have been
recognized and established by the Supreme Court.27  Express preemption
occurs when Congress uses express, explicit terms to preempt state author-
ity.28  Field preemption is implied in situations where a scheme of federal
regulation is
‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it,’ because ‘the Act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’29
Conflict preemption occurs where state law actually conflicts with fed-
eral law, to the extent that compliance with both regulations is impossible
(sometimes called impossibility preemption),30 or where state law presents
an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress” (sometimes called obstacle preemption).31  The CSA
does contain a statement by Congress of its intended preemptive effect,
stating:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same
25 See id. (“[P]revious memoranda specifically addressed the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in states with laws authorizing marijuana cultivation and distribution for medical
use. . . . [H]owever, both the existence of a strong and effective state regulatory system,
and an operation’s compliance with such a system, may allay the threat that an operation’s
size poses to federal enforcement interests.”).
26 See id. at 4 (“[N]othing herein precludes investigation or prosecution, even in the
absence of any one of the factors listed above, in particular circumstances where investiga-
tion and prosecution otherwise serves an important federal interest.”).
27 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 203–04 (1983) (discussing three types of preemption); see also English v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (same).
28 See Pac. Gas. & Elec., 461 U.S. at 203 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977)).
29 Id. at 204 (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).
30 See id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963)).
31 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State,
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter
and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.32
This statement clearly indicates Congress did not intend to occupy the
field, thus eliminating field preemption as an option.  In Gonzales v. Oregon,33
a case decided one year after Raich, the Supreme Court interpreted this pro-
vision to not include field preemption.  The Court asserted “[t]he CSA
explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled sub-
stances, as evidenced by its pre-emption provision.”34
It thus seems that conflict preemption was the preemptive effect Con-
gress intended the CSA to have.  There has been disagreement about
whether this would include obstacle preemption, impossibility preemption,
or both,35 and this is a potentially important distinction because “[c]ourts
have only rarely invalidated a state law as preempted under the impossibility
prong of the positive conflict test.”36  Impossibility tends to require state or
federal law prohibit what the other requires, making compliance impossible.
In the case of state medical or even recreational marijuana legalization, one
is not required to possess, use, or cultivate marijuana, so refraining from use
would in most jurisdictions be a sufficient possibility to avoid preemption.37
Impossibility preemption could potentially have more of an impact on the
state regulatory measures that go beyond just removing state criminal sanc-
tions, and this is also the reality for obstacle preemption.  With the Supreme
Court declining to deal with preemption issues in its previous decisions
involving the CSA and marijuana,38 it is not entirely clear how this issue
would be decided.  This has not stopped states from passing laws legalizing
medical and recreational marijuana, though as will be seen below, these con-
cerns are addressed implicitly and explicitly in the amendments, statutes, and
legislative materials produced by the states.
32 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
33 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
34 Id. at 251.
35 See GARVEY & YEH, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing that the application of both types of
conflict preemption “is further supported by a 2009 Supreme Court opinion that applied
both impossibility and obstacle preemption in interpreting the effect of a similar preemp-
tion provision found within the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act” (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 565–68 (2009))).
36 Id. at 10 (noting that the impossibility prong is “vanishingly narrow” (citing Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000))).
37 See id. (citing Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d
518, 528 (Or. 2010)).
38 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding state statute invalid on Com-
merce Clause grounds); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483,
491 (2001) (holding state statute contravened language of Controlled Substances Act).
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E. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act passed in
December of 2014, and within this bill was a section providing that none of
the funds appropriated to the Department of Justice would be used “to pre-
vent [certain enumerated] States from implementing their own State laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
marijuana.”39  The Appropriations Act lists thirty-two states, as well as the
District of Columbia.40  The clear language of the statute makes evident sev-
eral points worth mentioning for the purposes of this Note.  Congress only
restricted Department of Justice funds with respect to medical marijuana.41
The restriction only applies to the states listed, so the Department of Justice
could prevent states from implementing such bills in the future.  The Depart-
ment of Justice memorandum from 2013 is still representative of current pol-
icy,42 so any states implementing medical marijuana plans in the future can
try tailoring their programs to address the issues targeted by the Department
of Justice’s enforcement priorities.43  It is also important to note that even
though Congress defunded enforcement efforts against medical marijuana,
medical use of the drug remains illegal under federal law.  If any of the listed
states, or a state implementing new medical marijuana legislation, were to do
a poor job with their system, they would potentially still be open to federal
action.  On April 1, 2015, a Justice Department spokesman said that the
Department did not believe “the amendment applies to cases against individ-
uals or organizations.”44  The Department of Justice instead reads the statute
to stop it from hindering “the ability of states to carry out their medical mari-
juana laws,” instead of preventing prosecutions of individuals acting under
those laws.45  When one considers this stance along with the previous Justice
Department memorandum from 2013, it does call into question whether
Congress’s action really changed anything.  If the Department of Justice con-
tinues to prosecute those individuals and dispensaries it deems not to be fol-
lowing their guidelines, it would seem nothing has changed.  This could
bring up questions of a lawsuit, but the reading adopted by the Department
of Justice does seem to be at least one reasonable, permissible reading of the
39 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-
235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2015).
40 Id. (listing “Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin”).
41 Id.
42 See Cole, supra note 20.
43 See id. at 1–2; see also supra notes 22–24 (discussing Department of Justice priorities
in depth).
44 Timothy M. Phelps, Justice Department Says It Can Still Prosecute Medical Marijuana
Cases, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
medical-marijuana-abusers-20150401-story.html.
45 Id. (quoting Department of Justice spokesman Patrick Rodenbush).
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text.  Such an interpretation by the Department could be entitled to defer-
ence,46 so that even a legal challenge may not change anything.  However, a
district court in California recently held “[t]he Government’s [reading of the
statute] tortures the plain meaning of the statute. . . . It defies language and
logic for the Government to argue that it does not ‘prevent’ California from
‘implementing’ its medical marijuana laws by shutting down these . . . heavily-
regulated medical marijuana dispensaries.”47
In the Congressional Record for the Consolidated and Further Continu-
ing Appropriations Act (Appropriations Act), several members of Congress
raised federalism concerns.  Representative Rohrabacher offered an amend-
ment to the bill that would become the previously mentioned Section 538 on
May 28, 2014.48  Representative Rohrabacher argued this is an area that
should be left to the states under the Tenth Amendment, and that this area
of criminal justice was for the states.49  Representative Cohen, later in the
record, cited Louis Brandeis for the proposition that the states are laborato-
ries of democracy, and allowing experimentation in some states benefits the
rest of the country, although he seemed to favor further restrictions by the
Department of Justice pertaining to recreational marijuana prosecution.50
Discussing the amendment one day later, Representative Broun of Georgia
stated “this is a states’ rights, states’ power issue, because many States across
the country . . . [are] considering allowing the medical use under the direc-
tion of a physician.”51  Representative Blumenauer of Oregon also asserted
that the amendment was important for letting “this process work going for-
ward where we can have respect for states’ rights.”52
While the above quotations and arguments are all in favor of the amend-
ment, several members of Congress also spoke out against the amendment.
Their arguments largely focused on the “negative issues regarding health
care and marijuana.”53  Congressman Fleming of Louisiana asserted that
46 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
47 Order re Motion to Dissolve Permanent Injunction, United States v. Marin All. for
Med. Marijuana, No. C 98-00086 CRB, 7, 10 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 19, 2015).
48 160 CONG. REC. H4878 (daily ed. May 28, 2014) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
49 Id. (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (“[T]his amendment gives us an opportunity
to show . . . what we really believe about the 10th Amendment to the Constitution, and it
gives us an opportunity to support the intentions of our Founding Fathers and Mothers.
They never meant for the Federal Government to play the preeminent role in criminal
justice.”).
50 Id. at H4907 (statement of Rep. Cohen) (“[T]he laboratories of democracy, the
States, as Louis Brandeis called them, are doing a great service to this country, in Colorado
and Washington, to see how it works. . . . And we can wait and see how those States’
experiments go.  And the Department of Justice is allowing the experiment to go on for
other States’ benefits.”).
51 Id. at H4984 (daily ed. May 29, 2014) (statement of Rep. Broun).
52 Id. (statement of Rep. Blumenauer).
53 Id. at H4907 (May 28, 2014) (statement of Rep. Fleming).
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“[i]t is time for the . . . Justice Department to do their job and enforce cur-
rent U.S. law that recognizes marijuana’s devastating impact on our children
and society.”54  The following day, he also cited Justice Scalia’s concurrence
in Gonzales v. Raich55 to support his argument that the CSA “does not violate
the Commerce Clause or the principles of State sovereignty.”56  Several other
Representatives also spoke out against the amendment, including Represen-
tative Harris from Maryland and Representative Wolf from Virginia, who
both argued against marijuana’s effectiveness as a medicine.57  This Note,
however, is focused on the federalism questions raised by the legalization of
medical and recreational marijuana, so the medical effectiveness of mari-
juana is not considered here.58  Overall, the federalism arguments used by
members of Congress here seem to favor the amendment, but Representative
Fleming provides an interesting example of an argument that considers the
Supremacy Clause and enforcement of the federal law.  Congress adopted
the amendment and passed it as part of the Act, and it represents an impor-
tant step in this issue’s progression.  With the Appropriations Act, both the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government have acquiesced
at least partially to the states on the issue of medical marijuana.  This is
potentially an unprecedented movement in the history of the United States.
F. Current Inter-State Litigation
Besides Congress’s action, Colorado and its recreational marijuana legis-
lation are the subject of several ongoing lawsuits.59  Nebraska and Oklahoma
border Colorado, and the attorneys general of both states are suing Colorado
over several provisions of the 2012 marijuana legalization measure, which
became Amendment 64.60  The lawsuit “is aimed more at the commercial
side of marijuana legalization, which created new systems of regulations and
taxes as well as recreational stores, dispensaries and production facilities that
are monitored and licensed by state officials.”61  State control and resources
54 Id.  Representative Fleming also proposed his own amendment to the Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, which would have reduced funds for the Dep-
uty Attorney General’s office “until the Attorney General enforces the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.” Id. at H4906.
55 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
56 160 CONG. REC. H4983 (daily ed. May 29, 2014) (statement of Rep. Fleming).
57 Id.
58 I have included the names of the Representatives and their arguments in hopes of
not distorting the debate in Congress, as there were several members of Congress on both
sides of the issue.
59 See, e.g., Jack Healy, Nebraska and Oklahoma Sue Colorado over Marijuana Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/nebraska-and-
oklahoma-sue-colorado-over-marijuana-law.html; Trevor Hughes, Sheriffs Sue Colorado Over
Legal Marijuana, USA TODAY (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/
03/05/sheriffs-from-three-states-sue-colorado-over-marijuana/24385401/.
60 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.  This lawsuit has also been filed directly to the
Supreme Court, as a legal dispute between states. See Healy, supra note 59.
61 Healy, supra note 59.
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being used for implementation of recreational marijuana has been one of
the most controversial aspects of marijuana legalization.62  Nebraska and Col-
orado allege that the law has led to “more arrests, more impounded vehicles
and higher jail and court costs” and has forced law enforcement “to spend
more time and dedicate more resources to handling marijuana-related
arrests.”63  Such accusations might raise interesting questions about the
police power, and the role of states as laboratories,64 when a state’s experi-
mentation has potentially serious adverse effects on other states.
After Nebraska and Oklahoma filed their lawsuit, sheriffs from Kansas,
Nebraska, and Colorado also filed suit in federal court in Denver.65  The
Colorado sheriff, who is the lead plaintiff, alleges that the conflict between
federal and Colorado law forces him to choose between violating the U.S.
and Colorado Constitutions.  The Kansas and Nebraska sheriffs have similar
claims to those of Nebraska and Oklahoma, alleging an increase in arrests, a
burden on the justice system, and increased overtime.66  With the earlier law-
suit filed directly to the Supreme Court, it seems likely that the decision in
that case will control several of the issues presented in the case brought by
the sheriffs.  Similar questions about states’ abilities to experiment, poten-
tially to the detriment of their neighbors, are presented here.  For the Colo-
rado sheriff, the Supremacy Clause would seem to dictate the law to follow,67
but the federal decision to limit enforcement of the law creates an interesting
scenario where federal officers will not enforce a federal law that state offi-
cials will.  Although not in this instance, one could imagine the creation of
interesting “no commandeering” questions, as Congress could enact a law,
limit federal enforcement, and effectively force state officials to shoulder the
responsibility of enforcement.
II. MEDICAL MARIJUANA STATE ARGUMENTS
A. Methodology
Having discussed the current legal landscape in Part I, this Part will go
through—in alphabetical order—state constitutional, statutory, and legisla-
tive material that provides for the state permitted use of medical marijuana.
Because the legalization of recreational marijuana is slightly different, it will
62 See supra Section I.D.
63 Healy, supra note 59.
64 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution
is far from clear.”).
65 See Hughes, supra note 59.
66 Id. For example, one of the plaintiffs is a sheriff from Deuel County, Nebraska,
where felony drug arrests have increased 400% over three years. Id.
67 U.S. CONST. art. IV.
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be discussed in Part III.  As was discussed in Section I.B, twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia have permitted medical marijuana in some
form as of this Note’s completion, and many of the arguments and published
purposes of the state statutes are very similar.  The quantity and quality of
available material has varied greatly, so that some states provided significantly
more information than others.68  This Part is designed to provide a survey of
the available primary source material, and hopefully illuminate trends and
similarities in the language and arguments utilized.
B. State Laws
1. Arizona
Arizona passed Proposition 203 in 2010, which was a ballot initiative
amending section 36 of the Arizona Statutes to add Chapter 28.1, which is
titled the “Arizona Medical Marijuana Act.”69  The Act features a list of “find-
ings” set out in Section 2,70 which includes several elements that are featured
throughout many of these statutes.  The first finding is a review of the histori-
cal use of marijuana as a medicine,71 and an assertion that in modern times
its therapeutic utility has also been acknowledged by many organizations,
“including the American Academy of HIV Medicine, American College of
Physicians, American Nurses Association, American Public Health Associa-
tion, Leukemia & Lymphoma Society and many others.”72  This statement
that the state perceives marijuana as medicinal and with beneficial uses could
be seen as implying it to be within the state police power, which generally
entrusts the state to protect the welfare of its citizens.  The statute then cites a
statistic from the FBI stating that 99 out of 100 arrests for marijuana occur
under state law, and so legalizing medical marijuana will protect most
patients.73  This same statistic is cited by several other states in their mari-
juana statutes to imply that this is a state issue, evidenced by their role in
current enforcement.  The Arizona statute, as will be seen, is very close to
68 This may be due to different allocations of resources on the state level and related
state efforts to make legislative records more readily accessible.
69 Proposition 203 (Ariz. 2010) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-28.1 (West
2015)).
70 Id.
71 Id. § 2(A) (“Marijuana’s recorded use as a medicine goes back nearly 5,000 years,
and modern medical research has confirmed beneficial uses for marijuana in treating or
alleviating the pain, nausea and other symptoms associated with a variety of debilitating
medical conditions, including cancer, multiple sclerosis and HIV/AIDS, as found by the
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in March 1999.”).
72 Id. § 2(C).
73 Id. § 2(D) (“Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime
Reports and the Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics show that approximately 99 out
of every 100 marijuana arrests in the U.S. are made under state law, rather than under
federal law.  Consequently, changing state law will have the practical effect of protecting
from arrest the vast majority of seriously ill patients who have a medical need to use
marijuana.”).
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those of several other states (Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and Vermont).
A list of the other states which had at that time legalized medical mari-
juana is provided, and the state then explicitly asserts that “Arizona joins in
this effort for the health and welfare of its citizens.”74  Having provided back-
ground in the earlier parts of the section, Arizona explicitly declares the stat-
ute to be for the welfare of its citizens.  The next section of the statute
appears mindful of potential preemption and commandeering concerns,
stating that complying with this Act does not put Arizona in violation of fed-
eral law, and that Arizona is not required to enforce federal law.75  The find-
ings section concludes by saying state law should differentiate between
medical and recreational marijuana for the purpose of protecting its citizens,
including patients, doctors, and providers, from penalties.76  Asserting that
state law should be the one to make a distinction could be another way for
Arizona to assert that this is a state police power issue, and the federal gov-
ernment should allow the state to regulate it.
2. California
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 was passed in California in 1996
and is codified in the California Health and Safety Code.77  The Act declares
its own purposes, and as it was the first such act passed it serves as a good
basis for examining the evolution of medical marijuana statutes over the past
twenty years.  The purpose section of the Act is very close to the final section
of the Arizona statute, declaring that it is to ensure the right of ill citizens to
obtain and use medical marijuana, as well as to protect their caregivers.78
The Act also lists several diseases wherein marijuana use purportedly might
provide relief,79 similar to the Arizona section that discussed the modern
medical uses of marijuana.  One difference is that this Act also declares as a
purpose “encourag[ing] the federal and state governments to implement a
plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all
patients in medical need of marijuana.”80  Unlike the Arizona statute, which
did not really acknowledge a federal role in regulating medical marijuana,
California does so here.
The Act was passed prior to the decision in Raich (being the California
statute involved in that case), and since that decision, the federal government
has conducted numerous raids on medical marijuana dispensaries in Califor-
74 Id. § 2(E).
75 Id. § 2(F) (“States are not required to enforce federal law or prosecute people for
engaging in activities prohibited by federal law.  Therefore, compliance with this act does
not put the state of Arizona in violation of federal law.”).
76 Id. § 2(G).
77 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2014).
78 Id. § 11362.5 (b)(1)(B).
79 Id. § 11362.5 (b)(1)(A).
80 Id. § 11362.5 (b)(1)(C).
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nia.81  More recently, California has continued to ask the federal government
to take action on this issue, including a Senate Joint Resolution in June 2010,
which called for the end of federal interference with state medical marijuana
laws, establishment of federal legal protections, encouragement of medical
research trials, and the creation of a federal medical marijuana policy.82
Additionally, a California Assembly Bill in 2007 acknowledged that post-
Raich, states have not
been able to completely legalize medical marijuana, [instead adopting a
strategy] generally immuniz[ing] medical marijuana users from state crimi-
nal liability. . . .  [M]edical marijuana users still generally remain protected
under medical marijuana state laws because federal agents typically do not
become involved in state criminal activities like marijuana possession.83
This assertion is similar to the one Arizona made in quoting the FBI
statistic, and will be seen in many of the state statutes.  The states acknowl-
edge they are enforcing marijuana prohibitions, and realistically their unilat-
eral action will halt most enforcement.
3. Colorado
As one of the now four states that have legalized recreational marijuana
use as well as medical use, Colorado is an important part of the state move-
ment.  For the purposes of this subsection of the Note, only the arguments
regarding medical marijuana will be examined.  Colorado voters passed an
amendment to Article 18 of their state constitution in 2000, which legalized
the use of medical marijuana for patients with “appropriately diagnosed
debilitating medical condition[s].”84  The Colorado Medical Marijuana Code
(CMMC) begins with a strong legislative declaration: “The general assembly
hereby declares that this article shall be deemed an exercise of the police
powers of the state for the protection of the economic and social welfare and
the health, peace, and morals of the people of this state.”85  Unlike the state-
ments of Arizona and California in their statutes, this section explicitly states
that Colorado believes the statute to be an exercise of the state police powers,
for purposes which the police power is typically understood to encompass.
The Colorado legislature also made a less resounding declaration of purpose
at a later point in the CMMC, stating a desire to help patients suffering from
serious medical conditions without being subject to criminal prosecution.86
Colorado has additional arguments which it makes for the legalization of rec-
reational marijuana, but those arguments will be discussed in Part III.
81 See Cal. S. Health Comm., Bill Analysis, S.J.R. 14, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (“[S]ince the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Gonzales case, there have been 150 federal raids on
medical marijuana dispensaries and distributors in California . . . [and] the DEA has
increased enforcement actions against marijuana dispensaries.”).
82 See Cal. Assemb. Comm., Bill Analysis, S.J.R. 14, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess.
83 Cal. Assemb. Comm., Comm. Rep., .Assemb. B. No. 2279, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess.
84 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406.3 (2014).
85 Id. § 12-43.3-102 (2014).
86 Id. § 25-1.5-106 (2014).
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4. Connecticut
Connecticut passed its medical marijuana statute in 2012,87 and unlike
the statutes passed in Arizona, California, and Colorado, it does not contain a
“purpose” or “findings” section.  Under Connecticut’s previous statutory
regime, any inconsistencies between federal and state scheduling of con-
trolled substances were resolved in favor of the federal schedule, unless Con-
necticut placed the drug in a higher schedule than the federal government.
This statute created an exception for marijuana, however, ordering it reclassi-
fied as a Schedule II substance and stating that Connecticut’s view on mari-
juana as having medical uses would prevail over the federal classification.88
Connecticut’s Office of Legislative Research also published a report in 2014
which acknowledged that the Department of Justice would not challenge the
legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington, “as long
as the states maintain strict regulatory control over marijuana.”89  While Con-
necticut is not actively considering legalizing recreational marijuana pres-
ently, this is one of many instances wherein a state proposed strict state
regulation of marijuana to avoid the potential ire of the Department of
Justice.90
5. Delaware
Delaware passed Senate Bill 17 in 2011, which amended Title 16 of the
Delaware Code to add the Delaware Medical Marijuana Act (DMMA) in
Chapter 49A.91  Passed a year later than the Arizona statute, section 1 of the
Delaware statute is labeled “Findings,” and contains nearly word-for-word the
same findings as the Arizona statute (and also Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Vermont).  Beginning with the historical usage of medical
marijuana, the DMMA then discusses the current medical uses, including the
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine report in 1999.92  Com-
paring this statute to Arizona’s, the main difference is the citation of a 2010
report that summarized studies demonstrating the medical efficacy of mari-
juana for numerous conditions.93  The DMMA then quotes the same FBI sta-
87 H.B. 5389, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012).
88 Id. § 18.
89 JAMES ORLANDO, OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, 2013-R-0442
(Conn. 2014).
90 JAMES ORLANDO, OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION FOR NON-
MEDICAL PURPOSES, 2014-R-0191 (Conn. 2014).
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901A–4926A (2011).
92 NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE, INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE: DIVISION OF NEUROSCIENCE AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH (Janet E. Joy et al.
eds., 1999).  This study is cited by many states as part of their statutory findings, which led
to passage of their respective statutes.
93 DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 16, § 4901A(b) (“Specifically, in February 2010, the Center for
Medicinal Cannabis Research released a lengthy report that summarized 15 recent studies
clearly demonstrating marijuana’s medical efficacy for a broad range of conditions.  These
studies, many of which were double blind, placebo-controlled trials, included neuropathic
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tistic that 99 out of 100 marijuana arrests occur under state law,94 lists the
states which at the time had legalized medical marijuana and asserts that
“Delaware joins in this effort for the health and welfare of its citizens,”95 and
concludes with the same preemption, commandeering, and state responsibil-
ity claims made by Arizona.96  Provided that the language is nearly identical,
Delaware is likely seeking to make implicit and explicit claims similar to those
of Arizona: the police power is reserved to the states, this power is to ensure
the health and welfare of Delaware’s citizens, the State is convinced by the
evidence that medical marijuana use will be beneficial, and with the vast
majority of prosecutions under state law, legalization on the state level will
effectively end prosecution of those using medical marijuana in Delaware.
Besides what was officially included in the statute, there is an additional
statement of findings by the Health and Human Development Committee of
the Delaware Senate.  The committee found that “[t]he bill provides regula-
tion at every step in the process and includes common sense safeguards.  The
committee was moved by the testimony of patients with chronic debilitating
diseases and found that this bill properly protects the public while enabling
patients to use a needed option for disease management.”97  The emphasis
on regulation and safeguards could be important for Delaware in avoiding
federal intervention.  Additionally, here the traditional state interests of pro-
tecting the public, while also providing options to improve health and well-
being, could also be motivating factors.
6. Hawaii
Hawaii’s medical marijuana statute took effect in 2000, adding the Medi-
cal Use of Marijuana part to Chapter 329 of their revised statutes.98  While
the statute itself doesn’t provide findings, the implementing bill fortunately
does.  The legislature of Hawaii declared that modern medical research has
discovered marijuana can be beneficially used in the treatment of certain
illnesses, and although it “is aware of the legal problems associated with the
legal acquisition of marijuana for medical use. . . . [The] medical scientific
evidence on the medicinal benefits of marijuana should be recognized.”99
The legislature then acknowledges the actions taken by other states to legal-
ize medical marijuana and states that “[t]he legislature intends to join in this
initiative for the health and welfare of its citizens,” and that the purpose of
pain trials published in the Journal of Pain, Neuropsychopharmacology and Neurology, a study
on the analgesic efficacy of smoked marijuana published in Anesthesiology, a study on the
mechanisms of cannabinoid analgesia in rats published in Pain, and a study on vaporiza-
tion as a ‘smokeless’ marijuana delivery system published in Clinical Pharmacology &
Therapeutics.”).
94 Id. § 4901A(d); supra note 73 and accompanying text.
95 DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 16, § 4901A(e); supra note 74 and accompanying text.
96 DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 16, § 4901A(f); supra notes 75–76.
97 S. 146-17, Reg. Sess. (Del. 2011).
98 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121–123 (West 2015).
99 S. 20-862, 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999).
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the Act is to avoid penalizing ill citizens who use marijuana for medical pur-
poses.100  The statute is very similar to several of the other state statutes
examined so far: it accounts for the medical research that justifies the state
use of the police power for the welfare of its citizens despite the federal gov-
ernment not acknowledging medical use.
Additionally, in 2014 there was a concurrent resolution in the Hawaiian
House of Representatives which had the goal of requesting the DEA initiate
proceedings to reschedule marijuana.101  This resolution states explicitly that
one of the powers reserved to the states under the federal system is the power
to permit medical use of controlled substances.102  It also asserts that the
federal system currently misclassifies marijuana given its accepted use for
medical purposes in Hawaii, and by enacting the CSA with reclassification
procedures Congress intended to allow changes in federal scheduling.103
The clear mention of federalism differentiates this legislative resolution from
the materials of many other states, although the same federalism concerns do
appear to be implied by their arguments that this is within their police
power.
7. Illinois
Illinois passed its medical marijuana statute in 2013, creating the Com-
passionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act.104  This statute, like
those of Arizona and Delaware, contains a “findings” section, with language
nearly identical to those two.105  This statute, though passed in 2013, does
not contain the 2010 study found in the Delaware statute.  The main differ-
ences are that it updated the statistic regarding the number of patients who
have been recommended marijuana by licensed physicians106 and added
those states which have passed medical marijuana laws to the list included in
100 Id. (“Therefore, the purpose of this Act is to ensure that seriously ill people are not
penalized by the State for the use of marijuana for strictly medical purposes when the
patient’s treating physician provides a professional opinion that the benefits of medical use
of marijuana would likely outweigh the health risks for the qualifying patient.”).
101 H.R. Con. Res. No. 234, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2014).
102 Id. (“[O]ur structure of government, known as federalism, allows for the distribu-
tion of power between the states and the federal government; and . . . one of the powers
that remains with the states is the authority to allow the medical use of specified controlled
substances under certain circumstances . . . .”).
103 Id. (“[T]he Department of Health recognizes the medical use of marijuana pursu-
ant to Hawaii law; and . . . Marinol [a drug with an active ingredient found naturally in
marijuana] has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration and the Drug
Enforcement Administration as a Schedule 3 medication . . . [thus] the acceptance of the
use of marijuana for medical purposes in the State means that marijuana does not satisfy
the criteria for scheduling as a federal Schedule I controlled substance . . . .”).
104 Pub. Act 098-0122 (Ill. 2014).
105 Supra Sections I.B, I.F.
106 Pub. Act 098-0122 § 5(c) (“Cannabis has many currently accepted medical uses in
the United States, having been recommended by thousands of licensed physicians to at
least 600,000 patients in states with medical cannabis laws.”).
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the earlier statutes.107  Besides those alterations, Illinois makes the same
claims as the many of the other states: the state is acting for the welfare of its
citizens, complying with the statute does not put the state in violation of fed-
eral law, the state cannot be required to enforce federal law, and state law
should provide a distinction between medical and non-medical marijuana
use.108
8. Massachusetts
Massachusetts voters approved a ballot initiative legalizing medical mari-
juana in 2012, under Chapter 369.109  The Bill contains a comparatively brief
statement of purpose and intent: “The citizens of Massachusetts intend that
there should be no punishment under state law for qualifying patients, physi-
cians and health care professionals, personal caregivers for patients, or medi-
cal marijuana treatment center agents for the medical use of marijuana, as
defined herein.”110  The statute, in section 7, also claims that nothing con-
tained in the law requires the violation of federal law, or poses an obstacle to
federal enforcement of federal law.111  The purpose statement does not deal
very deeply with federalism claims, but the latter section appears to address
the possibility of either type of conflict preemption, and disclaims any intent
of Massachusetts to conflict with federal law.
9. Michigan
Michigan passed its statute permitting the use of medical marijuana,
known as the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), in 2008.112  Sec-
tion 2 of the MMMA declares its findings, and is a shorter version of the
findings found in the Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Vermont statutes.  This statute contains only four of the elements: it cites
modern medical research, the FBI marijuana arrests statistic (99 out of 100
are made under state law), declares states are not required to enforce federal
law, and that Michigan joins the states that have legalized medical marijuana
for “the health and welfare of its citizens.”113  Michigan did pass this law ear-
lier than the states cited previously, so the additional parts added to the find-
ings of the newer states could be seen as demonstrating the evolution of
these findings as justification for passage of medical marijuana statutes.
10. Montana
Montana’s voters approved Initiative 148 in 2004, but this medical mari-
juana program was replaced by Senate Bill 423 in 2011, which enacted a new
107 Id.
108 Id. § 5(e), (f), (g).
109 H.B. 3885, 187th Gen. Court, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012).
110 Id. § 1.
111 Id. § 7(F).
112 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421–333.26430 (West 2015).
113 Id. § 333.26422.
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medical marijuana program called the Montana Marijuana Act.114  Montana
declared that its purposes were to protect persons with serious medical condi-
tions who use marijuana for medical purposes, and to give local government
a role in regulating marijuana to protect the welfare of their citizens.115
Although the language about protecting ill persons is fairly common among
other statutes, declaring giving the local governments a role in establishing
standards as a purpose is something different than most others.  This is worth
noting as a potential variable in the effectiveness of state regulation, where
the potential for federal intervention is a looming question.  This is
explained further in M.C.A. Section 50-46-328, where the statute provided
that for purposes of “public health, safety, or welfare” a local government can
regulate providers of marijuana and prohibit them from operating as
storefront businesses.116  Seeing as this appears to be a way for local govern-
ments to provide extra, as opposed to less, regulation, the additional power
to regulate could potentially help Montana avoid federal intervention under
the current Department of Justice policy.  This policy could also potentially
be a negative if local governments are inconsistent, lax, or ineffective in serv-
ing a regulatory role.
11. Nevada
Nevada voters passed a constitutional amendment in 2000 which permit-
ted the medical use of marijuana.117  In the “Arguments for Passage” section
of the ballot initiative, it was stated that “this proposal can make a difference
in the lives of thousands of persons suffering from . . . serious illnesses.  The
initiative is an attempt to balance the needs of patients with the concerns of
society about marijuana use.”118  The Nevada legislature in 2001 also passed
a statute shortly after the constitutional amendment, which contained
numerous justifications for the state action.  The most important for the pur-
poses of this Note was an assertion that regardless of the decisions of the
federal government, it was the duty of the state to carry out the will of the
people and regulate their well-being in the way they have decided and voted
for.119
114 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301–344 (2011).
115 Id. § 50-46-301(2) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to “provide legal protec-
tions to persons with debilitating medical conditions who engage in the use of marijuana
to alleviate the symptoms of the debilitating medical condition . . . [and] give local govern-
ments a role in establishing standards for the cultivation, manufacture, and use of mari-
juana that protect the public health, safety, and welfare of residents within their
jurisdictions”).
116 Id. § 50-46-328.
117 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 38 (LexisNexis, through the Seventy-Seventh (2013) and the
Twenty-Seventh Special (2013) Session).
118 SEC’Y OF STATE DEAN HELLER, NEV. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF NEVADA:
BALLOT QUESTIONS 2000, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/Ballot
Questions/2000.pdf.
119 Assemb. B. 453, 71st Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2001) (“The people of the State of Nevada
recognized the importance of this research and the need to provide the option for those
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Although these laws were enacted over ten years ago, the federalism
principles and debates have persisted as Nevada has continued to refine its
medical marijuana system.  Sorting through the minutes of the Nevada
Assembly demonstrates that federalism concerns recently emerged several
times.  In a series of meetings during 2013, Nevada state senators discussed
the federal implications of medical marijuana legalization.  In a meeting on
June 1, 2013 of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, several Nevada state
senators and assemblymen discussed the federalism implications of legislat-
ing in this area.120  One of the assemblymen, Ira Hansen, a plumber and self-
professed rebel,121 asked his fellow committee members how he could
uphold his oath to defend the U.S. Constitution and still pass laws legalizing
and regulating marijuana, being mindful of the Supremacy Clause.122  Sena-
tor Hutchison responded that the voters of Nevada decided to amend the
constitution of Nevada to allow for medical marijuana, and as a result he has
a state constitutional obligation to enforce those provisions as approved by
the people of the state.123  He also seemed to suggest that since the CSA is
statutory (not a constitutional provision), and that the federal government
has claimed to not want to prosecute those using marijuana unless state regu-
lation is lacking, his obligation as a Nevada state senator is to follow the state
constitution.124  While these assertions might not necessarily be correct,125
they do serve as an example of a state legislative debate on this issue.
suffering from certain medical conditions to alleviate their pain with the medical use of
marijuana, and in the general elections held in 1998 and 2000, voiced their overwhelming
support for a constitutional amendment to allow for the medical use of marijuana in this
state under certain circumstances; and . . . [w]hile the legislature respects the important
and difficult decisions the Federal Government faces in exercising the powers delegated to
it by the United States Constitution to establish policies and rules that are in the best
interest of this nation, the State of Nevada as a sovereign state has the duty to carry out the
will of the people of this state and to regulate the health, medical practices and well-being
of those people in a manner that respects their personal decisions concerning the relief of
suffering through the medical use of marijuana . . . .”).
120 Nev. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary Minutes, 77th Sess. (Nev. Jun. 1, 2013).
121 Id. (“I am a plumber . . . [and] a sagebrush rebel” (quoting Assemblyman
Hansen)).
122 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123 Minutes, supra note 120 (“The voters of this state said we, through an initiative,
constitutional, and legal process, have decided we want to use medical marijuana and
make it legal in this state.  Once that occurred, I have a constitutional obligation to enforce
those provisions.  I do not get to pick and choose.”).
124 Id. (“I know that currently federal law and the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of
federal law, by the way, it is not a constitutional right, under the United States Constitution—
it is merely statutory law—prohibits the use of these substances.  The current Chief Law
Enforcement Officer of the federal government has said if you are following state law, we
are not going to require you to shut down your establishments and facilities.  That has
been a policy decision by the Chief Executive Officer of the federal government.  Our state
Constitution says you must do this.”).
125 That federal law is supreme where it conflicts with state law seems to be a fairly
uncontroversial reading of the Supremacy Clause, regardless of whether the federal law is
statutory and the state law is constitutional.  The better constitutional argument seems to
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In a second Assembly Committee meeting held the next day, June 2,
2013, the Supremacy Clause and federal law were again discussed.126  The
committee members expressed concern about the federal government’s
interest in shutting down dispensaries in other states.  Senator Segerblom
argued that while the federal government has prosecuted some dispensaries
in California, they have not done so in Colorado, and the difference to him
was the high level of control and regulation that Colorado has in place, ver-
sus the less stringent regulations of California.127  At the conclusion of the
meeting, there was also a disagreement about whether the statute should
include language which directly implicated the Tenth Amendment, but the
Committee decided to instead base their power in the Nevada
constitution.128
The Nevada Assembly also had discussions regarding the legalization of
recreational marijuana, although the state has not yet decided to take that
action.  On March 29, 2013, Senators Brower, Segerblom, and Jones dis-
cussed the potential conflict between federal and state law.129  Senators
Brower and Segerblom were concerned with the possibility of the legislature
placing Nevadans in a conflicted position between federal and state law,
where the only protection would be the current Administration’s word that
they would not prosecute dispensaries, although they could.130  Senator
Jones responded that the legislature is not putting Nevadans “into the Catch-
22,” because ultimately the legalization does not require action, it just
enables the action under state law, and the conflict arises when they choose
to act.131  This argument seems relatively similar to the idea that when it
comes to conflict preemption, a state simply permitting conduct without any
affirmative action would not be preempted.132
In another Nevada Assembly meeting taking place on April 5, 2013,
Assemblymen Hansen, Hogan, and Martin also discussed federalism con-
cerns implicated by the passage of marijuana legalization.133  Assemblyman
Hansen asserted that as much as he is in favor of states’ rights, he was con-
cerned about what he considered “ignoring the federal law and trying to pre-
tend it is legal, even though [they] know that others are doing this
be based on impossibility preemption, and the state and federal laws not actually being in
conflict.
126 Minutes of the Meeting of the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Sess. (Nev. Jun. 2, 2013).
127 Id. at 4 (“In California there were some noncompliance issues, and the federal gov-
ernment did shut down some dispensaries.  In Colorado, which is the ultimate model
where everything is very tightly controlled, there have been no federal raids.”).
128 Id.
129 Minutes of the S. Comm. on Judiciary 28, 77th Sess. (Nev. Mar. 29, 2013).
130 Id.
131 Id. (“We are not putting Nevadans into the Catch-22; we are enabling them to take
action because they have a constitutional mandate to do so.  If they want to put themselves
into a Catch-22, it is their right.”).
132 See supra notes 35–37.
133 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 26–27
(Nev. Apr. 5, 2013).
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illegally.”134  However, he stated support of “a petition for [Nevada’s] federal
delegation to ask the states to become 50 independent laboratories and try to
come up with drug laws that actually work because current laws do not
work.”135  Assemblyman Joseph Hogan responded that there would certainly
be issues to work out.  However, while state legislators cannot change the
policy of the federal government, “within the state, [they] have the authority
to make it legal for people to use marijuana.  [They] will try to assure that the
federal government respects the rights of this state as [they] anticipate the
wealth in other states.”136  He considered the task at hand to be “ironing out
behaviors that will meet the needs of the [Drug Enforcement Agency and
Department of Justice] to enforce against larger-scale drug problems while
[the Nevada Assembly] take[s] care of the needs of the children of Nevada by
marketing and taxing the product.”137  Assemblyman Andrew Martin contin-
ued this line of argument, asserting that “[t]his is really about our economy.
Other states are doing this—Colorado, Hawaii, and Washington State.  I do
think there is precedent for what we are trying to do.  We need to be a
leader, not a follower.”138  The economic argument is one which seems to be
at least partially motivating the legalization of recreational marijuana in those
states which have taken that action, as will be seen infra Part III.
12. New Jersey
New Jersey passed its medical marijuana legalization bill in 2009, known
as the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act.139  This stat-
ute’s findings are similar to those found within the statutes of Arizona, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Passed the year after
Michigan’s statute, New Jersey’s statute contains an additional section stating
that “[c]ompassion dictates that a distinction be made between medical and
non-medical uses of marijuana,” as well as the statement that “compliance
with this act does not put the State of New Jersey in violation of federal
law,”140 both of which are found in the statutes of Arizona, Delaware, and
Illinois which were enacted afterwards.  The statute also makes the acknowl-
edgement of modern medical research, the FBI marijuana arrest statistic, the
listing of states where medical marijuana was legal, and that New Jersey was
taking action for the welfare of its citizens, as those other statutes do.141
134 Id. at 26 (statement of Assemb. Ira Hansen, Member, Comm. on Judiciary).
135 Id.
136 Id. (statement of Assemb. Joseph Hogan, Guest Legislator).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 27 (statement of Assemb. Andrew Martin, Member, Comm. on Judiciary).
139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 (West 2015).
140 Id. § 24:6I-2(e), (d).
141 Id.
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13. New York
New York recently passed its medical marijuana bill in 2014.142  The lan-
guage of the purpose statement appears to be different than many other
states’ purpose statements.  The declared purpose of the bill was to “strike
the right balance between potentially relieving the pain and suffering of
those in desperate need of a treatment and protecting the public against risks
to its health and safety.”143  Like the language of many other states’ statutes,
the language in New York’s statute evokes the idea that it is the state’s prerog-
ative to find the balance between health, welfare, and safety concerns of its
citizens.  Given the federal position of likely allowing state regulation to oper-
ate as long as it is effective, finding a balance between safety and health is
important for an effective regulation.  The sponsoring memorandum for Bill
6357 also contains a justification section.144  The National Academy of Sci-
ences report from 1999 is cited here,145 as well as several other studies and
opinions of doctors to support the sponsor’s premise that “[t]housands of
New Yorkers have serious medical conditions that may benefit from medical
use of marihuana . . . [and] [m]edical marihuana must be available to those
patients.”146  The memorandum also argues that the active ingredient in
marijuana, THC, has been legal in synthetic form under federal law, but the
purportedly more effective natural form has been illegal, and legalizing “the
medical use of effective medicine does not undermine the message that non-
medical use of illegal drugs is wrong.”147  This language again demonstrates
the state trying to find a balance between the health and welfare of its citizens
and safety and security, a vital part of avoiding federal prosecution under the
current administration’s policy.
14. Oregon
Oregon is one of the four states that has currently legalized recreational
marijuana, but Oregon voters previously passed an initiative in 1998 legaliz-
ing medical marijuana, called the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act
(OMMA).148  The findings contained in the OMMA are relatively short, with
a brief statement that marijuana has been found by patients and doctors to
be an effective treatment,149 and that Oregonians should be allowed to use
small amounts of marijuana when so advised by their doctor.150  As will be
142 See Assemb. B. 06357, 237th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014) (codified at N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–3369-E (McKinney 2015)).
143 Id.
144 See N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., N.Y. SPONS. MEMO., 2013 Assemb. B. 6357, 236th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter N.Y. SPONSOR MEMO].
145 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901A–4926A (2011); N.Y. SPONSOR MEMO, supra note
144.
146 N.Y. SPONSOR MEMO, supra note 144.
147 Id.
148 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475.300–346 (West 2015).
149 Id. § 475.300(1).
150 Id. § 475.300(2).
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seen, the statute permitting the recreational use of marijuana has a longer
“purpose” section that is closer to those statutes passed by states that have
legalized medical or recreational marijuana more recently, but seeing as the
original Act was passed in 1998, the justifications seen in other statutes might
not have been thought of as necessary to include in a pre-Raich statute.
15. Rhode Island
Rhode Island passed its medical marijuana statute in 2006, called The
Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act.151  This
statute also contained a findings section much like those found in the stat-
utes of Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Vermont.  The
statute acknowledges modern medical research, the FBI marijuana arrest sta-
tistic, the listing of states where medical marijuana was legal, and that Rhode
Island was taking action for the welfare of its citizens.152  Like the legislation
of the other six states, Rhode Island may have been utilizing this findings
section to justify its legalization of medical marijuana under its use of the
state police power.
16. Vermont
Vermont passed its first law legalizing the medical use of marijuana in
2004, amending Chapter 86 of the Vermont Statutes to be titled “Therapeu-
tic Use of Cannabis.”153  Section 1 of Vermont House Bill 111 includes the
“findings and purpose” section, which—as seen in the statutes of Arizona,
Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Rhode Island—is nearly identi-
cal, and goes though the same procession of justifications in each state’s stat-
ute.154  This, however, is the earliest medical marijuana statute, and could
therefore be the source for some of the language other states have used; in
2003 the District Court for the Northern District of California155 and the
Ninth Circuit156 made their decisions in the cases leading up to Raich.157  It
is plausible that the State of Vermont was aware of some of the issues that this
legislation could present, and in using this language was attempting to justify
its action on police power (and implicitly federalism) grounds.
17. Washington
Washington citizens passed Initiative Measure 692 (IM 692) in 1998,158
which legalized the medical use of marijuana under Title 69 of the Revised
151 See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-1 (2015).
152 See id. §§ 21-28.6-2(1)–(3), (6).
153 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4471–4474m (2015).
154 See S. 76, 67th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2004); supra subsections II.B.2, II.B.6, II.B.8,
II.B.10, II.B.13.
155 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
156 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
157 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
158 See 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1–6.
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Code of Washington.159  IM 692 included a brief “purpose and intent” sec-
tion, which asserted that the people of Washington found that some ill per-
sons may benefit from medical marijuana,160 and “humanitarian compassion
necessitates that the decision to authorize the medical use of marijuana by
patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses is a personal, individual deci-
sion, based upon their physician’s professional medical judgment and discre-
tion.”161  The Washington legislature in the Revised Code of Washington also
declared its findings that there are numerous conditions which persons suf-
fer from that may be alleviated by the medical use of marijuana.  Similarly
motivated by “[h]umanitarian compassion,” the legislature found the use of
medical marijuana should be a “personal, individual decision” based upon
professional medical advice.162  The language seems basically identical to the
IM 692 language because the legislature amended the statute in 2011 and
replaced the “people of Washington state” phrase with “legislature.”163  This
might be more of a semantic point, but being mindful of the potential for
review of what intent and purpose the legislature had in enacting the statute,
perhaps the legislature thought it necessary to clarify that the above were
their intent and purpose.
C. State Medical Marijuana Legislation Conclusions
Reading through the language of the various states’ legislation, there are
common arguments and justifications to be found.  Most clearly connected
are the seven states that share very similar language in their statutes: Arizona,
Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The
language they use seems to implicate the same general ideas, which are tied
to federalism concerns.  They can be seen as arguing that the police power is
reserved to the states, that under this power the state is able to ensure the
health and welfare of its citizens, and that the evidence convinced the state
that medical marijuana use will benefit the health and welfare of its citizens.
With the citation of the FBI statistic showing the vast majority of prosecutions
occur under state law, legalization on the state level will effectively end prose-
cution of those using medical marijuana in these states, and they appear to
believe it is within their power to do so in the interests of their citizens.
Other states outside of this group also explicitly (Colorado) and implicitly
(Hawaii, Montana, and New York) appear to invoke the police power as justi-
fication for their action.  Another main component included by several states
was what appeared to be an anticipation of preemption claims, and the
resulting sections disclaiming any intent to present an obstacle or directly
conflict with federal law.  Until this issue is resolved, either by the courts or
Congress, it seems likely to be something states include in their statutes as a
159 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.51A.005–69.51A.903 (2015).
160 See 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 2.
161 Id.
162 WASH. REV. CODE. § 69.51A.005(1)(b) (2015).
163 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 1346.
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result of the legal uncertainty surrounding the preemption question.  The
issue of strong, tight regulation was also seen in the language of several states,
and plausibly could be a reaction to the position of the Department of Jus-
tice.  With federal policy favoring strong state regulation, some states seemed
to want to make their intention of strong regulation apparent in the legisla-
tion itself.
III. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA STATE ARGUMENTS
A. Methodology
Having at this point examined statutes and other sources from many of
the states that have currently legalized medical marijuana, it is important to
look at the arguments made in favor of legalizing recreational marijuana.
Like Part II, Part III will provide a survey of the primary source material, once
again illuminating trends and similarities in the language and methods used
among the states
B. State Medical Marijuana Laws
1. Alaska
Alaskan voters passed Ballot Measure 2 in 2014, amending Alaska Stat-
utes Title 17 to include a new chapter, 38, which legalized and regulated
marijuana for recreational use.  The measure and approved new chapter
begin with a section on purpose and findings like many of the medical mari-
juana statutes.  The Act first declares that “[i]n the interest of allowing law
enforcement to focus on violent and property crimes, and to enhance indi-
vidual freedom, the people of the state of Alaska find and declare that the
use of marijuana should be legal for persons 21 years of age or older.”164
This statement of purpose, and the one that follows,165 appear to condition
the legalization of marijuana on the use of the police power and the associ-
ated ability of the states “to make and enforce laws protecting the health,
safety, welfare, and morals of their citizens.”166  The statute also seems to
envision the possibility of a preemption challenge in the future, and includes
a clause which appears to claim that nothing in the Act would result in
impossibility or obstacle preemption.167
164 ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010(a) (2015).
165 See id. § 17.38.010(b) (“In the interest of the health and public safety of our citi-
zenry, the people of the state of Alaska further find and declare that the production and
sale of marijuana should be regulated . . . .”).
166 Amicus Brief of Alabama et al., supra note 19, at 10.
167 See ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010(d) (“Nothing in this Act proposes or intends to
require any individual or entity to engage in any conduct that violates federal law, or
exempt any individual or entity from any requirement of federal law, or pose any obstacle
to federal enforcement of federal law.”).
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2. Colorado
Colorado citizens passed Amendment 64 to their state constitution in
2012, legalizing recreational marijuana twelve years after legalizing medical
marijuana.168  This constitutional amendment, like many of the statutes pre-
viously cited, included a purpose and findings section.  The amendment first
declares that:
In the interest of the efficient use of law enforcement resources, enhancing
revenue for public purposes, and individual freedom, the people of the state
of Colorado find and declare that the use of marijuana should be legal for
persons twenty-one years of age or older and taxed in a manner similar to
alcohol.169
This statement is very similar to that of Alaska’s Ballot Measure 2,
although Amendment 64 adds “enhancing revenue for public purposes” to
the purposes of efficient use of law enforcement resources and promoting
individual freedom.  This idea of increasing revenue for the state was also
one of the reasons seen in the Nevada Assembly meeting, and particularly
was a reason the Nevada Assembly thought passing legalization measures
sooner would be better for the state (and a means to increase revenue).170
Amendment 64 also declares that marijuana will be regulated similarly to
alcohol, “[i]n the interest of the health and public safety of our citizenry,”171
and asserts that besides the provided-for exceptions, “it is necessary to ensure
consistency and fairness in the application of this section throughout the
state and that, therefore, the matters addressed by this section are . . . matters
of statewide concern.”172  While some state regulatory schemes permit local
governments some control, Colorado decided to pursue a more uniform
approach, which may be the better policy.  Facing the threat of potential fed-
eral action, keeping all regulation at the state as opposed to the local level
might make it easier to demonstrate to the federal government that their
policy interests173 are accounted for.
In the wake of Amendment 64’s passage, the Governor of Colorado cre-
ated a task force to identify the legal, policy, and procedural issues needing
resolution, and among these issues was the “[r]econciliation of Colorado and
federal laws such that the new laws and regulations do not subject Colorado
state and local governments and state and local government employees to
prosecution by the federal government.”174  In the Amendment 64 Task
Force Final Report, issued on March 13, 2013, the task force asserted that its
plan was designed “to ease implementation and enforcement and to demon-
168 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; id. amend. 64 (2012).
169 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a) (LexisNexis, through Second Regular Sess. Of
Sixty-Ninth Gen. Assemb. of the State of Colo. (2014)).
170 See Minutes, supra note 133, at 24–25.
171 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b).
172 Id. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(d).
173 See supra note 22.
174 Colo. Exec. Order B 2012-004 (2012).
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strate to the federal government that Colorado is sticking with a regulatory
model that has worked.”175  Several times throughout the report, the task
force stressed that its recommendations were meant to “reduc[e] the likeli-
hood of federal scrutiny,”176 demonstrating the strong effect the Department
of Justice position has had.  As the state senator from Nevada explained, the
Colorado system has provided a great example for other states looking to
avoid the ire of the federal government, so this focus of the state seems in
line with their previous actions.177
3. Oregon
Oregon voters passed Measure 91 in 2014, which was added to the Ore-
gon Revised Statutes as the Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana
and Industrial Hemp Act.178  Although the purposes were not added to the
Oregon Revised Statutes,179 they were listed as part of Measure 91, under
Section 1(1).  Measure 91 stated that its purposes were to
eliminate the problems caused by the prohibition and uncontrolled manu-
facture, delivery, and possession of marijuana within this state . . . [and]
protect the safety, welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state by
prioritizing the state’s limited law enforcement resources in the most effec-
tive, consistent, and rational way . . . .180
The purpose of protecting the general welfare of the people was also
included in the statutes of Alaska and Colorado previously examined, as was
utilizing limited law enforcement resources, and both appear within the
scope of the state’s police power.181  The elimination of associated problems
seems vague, and could implicate many issues.182  Perhaps following the
example set by Colorado’s regulatory success, Measure 91 also declares that a
purpose is to “establish a comprehensive regulatory framework concerning
marijuana under existing state law.”183  In addition, Measure 91 states that
nothing within the Act (Measure 91) may be construed as requiring a person
to violate a federal law or obstruct federal law.184  Similar to the section
175 AMENDMENT 64 IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF AMENDMENT 64: REGULATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 7 (2013), http://www
.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
176 Id. at 18; see also id. at 17, 24, 33, 50, 98.
177 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 29
(Nev. June 1, 2013) (statement of Jennifer Soles).
178 Measure 91 (Or. 2014).
179 Id. § 2.
180 Id. §§ 1(1)(a)–(b).
181 See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
182 A potential understanding might be found in Washington’s statute, infra Section
III.D.
183 Measure 91, supra note 178, § 1(1)(e).
184 Id. §§ 4(5)–(6).
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included in the Alaska statute, this section seems potentially directed at any
future obstacle preemption or impossibility preemption claims.185
4. Washington
Washington voters passed Initiative Measure No. 502 (IM 502) in 2012,
which added new sections to the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter
69.50, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana.186  The “intent” section is
within the first part of Initiative Measure 502, and has three intended goals.
IM 502 intends to permit law enforcement to focus on violent and property
crime,187 generate “new state and local tax revenue for education, health
care, research, and substance abuse prevention,”188 and remove marijuana
from the control of illegal organizations, instead subjecting it to strict regula-
tion.189  The need for law enforcement efficiency was mentioned by Alaska,
Colorado, and Oregon in their laws, and Colorado’s amendment also had
the stated purpose of generating tax revenue for “public purposes.”190  The
purpose of removing marijuana from control of illegal organizations could
be similar to Oregon’s measure that sought to eliminate the problems associ-
ated with the prohibition of and illegal activities surrounding marijuana.191
Here, though, it is also connected to the other purpose, having a state regula-
tory scheme, and as has been discussed previously this could be a response of
the states to the Department of Justice’s current policy.
C. State Recreational Marijuana Legislation Conclusions
As with the medical marijuana legislation, state statutes legalizing recrea-
tional marijuana share some similarities.  Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and
Washington all emphasized the efficient use of law enforcement resources,
and Alaska, Colorado, and Oregon stated that legalization was in the interest
of public welfare.  Both purposes appear aimed to place the legalization legis-
lation within the state’s use of the police power.  Similar language was uti-
lized in the medical marijuana legislation as well, potentially for the same
reason.  Colorado, Oregon, and Washington also mention having strong reg-
ulation of the conduct.  Oregon and Washington’s choice to highlight the
removal of marijuana from illegal organizations could also be connected to
an overall purpose of demonstrating to the federal government that the
states’ regulation is sufficient and addresses their concerns.  Alaska and Ore-
185 ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010(d) (2014).
186 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.04, 46.20, 46.61, 69.50 (2015).
187 Id. § 1(1) (“Allow[ing] law enforcement resources to be focused on violent and
property crimes . . . .”).
188 Id. § 1(2).
189 Id. § 1(3) (explaining that the Initiative Measure intends to “[t]ake[ ] marijuana
out of the hands of illegal drug organizations and bring[ ] it under a tightly regulated,
state-licensed system”).
190 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).
191 Measure 91, supra note 178.
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gon also included sections that could be meant to address future preemption
claims.  Lastly, increased revenue was a purpose included by Colorado and
Washington, and the revenue is said to be for the benefit of the public, which
could be a way the states meant to relate revenue generation to citizen wel-
fare and the police power.
IV. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION
A. Introduction: Child Labor Law Development
The marijuana legalization process is perhaps a unique development.
Many historical examples conclude with state governments acquiescing to the
federal government.  With marijuana legalization, states have opposed the
federal government in increasing numbers, and the federal government
appears to be backing off.  To demonstrate how these developments are
unique, this Section will discuss another historical example of a disagreement
between federal and state law.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the federal govern-
ment, backed by the Supremacy Clause, tends to prevail.
Child labor law is one of the first areas that might come to mind when
trying to find a historically analogous situation.  A Congressional Research
Service Report from 2005 provides an excellent summary of child labor his-
tory.192  For the purpose of framing the issue, this Section will briefly summa-
rize this history.  Child labor became a contested issue in the late nineteenth
century, and this continued into the twentieth century.193  Although some
reform was attempted at the state level at first,194 the complexity of the prob-
lem195 led reformers to acknowledge that federal action would be needed to
address the problem sufficiently.196  There were several attempts at federal
action, beginning with an unsuccessful attempt to ban child labor in factories
and mines in 1906, though “the proposal raised the visibility of child labor as
a public policy issue.”197  In 1907, Congress passed a law permitting the Sec-
retary of Commerce and Labor to conduct an investigation into the condi-
tions of woman and child workers, which resulted in a survey spanning
multiple volumes and years; this record provided a basis for Congressional
192 WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31501, CHILD LABOR IN AMERICA:
HISTORY, POLICY, AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES (2005).
193 Id. at 3.
194 Id. at 4.
195 Id.  Besides the various types of work children might do,
industrial homework by children was especially difficult to restrain. . . .
[C]hildren worked in tenement sweatshops making clothing, processing food,
and engaging in whatever other work might profitably be conducted at home.
Any tenement might become a little factory where conditions were adverse . . .
and hours of work were unrestrained except by exhaustion.
Id.
196 Id. (stating concerns about employers moving to other states and creating a damag-
ing race to the bottom).
197 Id.
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attempts to tackle child labor.198  Throughout the next twenty years, Con-
gress made several legislative attempts, but encountered trouble in the
courts.199  The Owen-Keating Act banned the interstate movement of certain
child labor products,200 but the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional
in Hammer v. Dagenhart.201  After this attempt failed, Congress enacted the
Pomerene Act in 1919 which added a ten percent tax on industries employ-
ing children in violation of specified standards.202  The Supreme Court also
declared this Act unconstitutional in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.203
Following this second failure in the courts, Congress proposed a child
labor amendment in 1924,204 but it failed to gather momentum in the states.
Nearly a decade later, following the election of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, child labor provisions found a place within the New Deal.  Con-
gress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 creating the
National Recovery Administration, which encouraged industries to develop
codes of fair competition.205  Unfortunately for child labor reform, the
Supreme Court also held the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitu-
tional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.206  Following this deci-
sion against the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, there was a change
in the Supreme Court’s thinking in 1937.  After striking down several aspects
of the New Deal, the Court signaled that it might be willing to change how it
viewed government power.207  The Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, upholding a Washington state law fixing the minimum wage for women
and children.208  One year later, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).209  The FLSA included various child labor provisions210 and,
unlike its predecessors, remained constitutional.
198 Id. at 4.  These reports appeared in nineteen volumes from 1910 to 1913.
199 There was, additionally, “[a] regional struggle . . . in progress [that] pitted one state
against another in a contest for economic growth . . . [and] Southern manufacturers
viewed child labor restriction as an ‘effort of northern agitators to kill the infant industries
of the South.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Grace Abbott, Federal Regulation of Child Labor, 1906–38,
13 SOC. SERV. REV. 409, 411 (1939)).
200 Id.
201 247 U.S. 251 (1918).  The Court, in this well-known case, held that the Act was
unconstitutional because Congress’s commerce power did not extend to purely local
matters.
202 See WHITTAKER, supra note 192, at 5.
203 259 U.S. 20 (1922).  The Court declared that “the provisions of the so-called taxing
act must be naturally and reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely to
the achievement of some other purpose plainly within state power.” Id. at 43.
204 See WHITTAKER, supra note 192, at 5.
205 Id. at 6.
206 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
207 See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s change in thinking); William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV.
347 (discussing the lead up and evolution of President Roosevelt’s plan).
208 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
209 See WHITTAKER, supra note 192, at 7.
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B. Comparison
An immediately apparent distinction between marijuana legalization
and child labor laws is that the child labor movement was a regulatory move-
ment, whereas marijuana legalization can be considered a deregulatory
movement.211  The states attempted to pass child labor laws, but they were
ineffective, which necessitated the involvement of Congress to craft a
national solution.212  However, federal law made marijuana illegal first,213
and then states acted on their own to carve out exceptions: first for medical
and then recreational marijuana.214
Initially, some states resisted the federal efforts to enact child labor laws,
which some have attributed to concerns about manufacturing capabilities
post–Civil War.215  The state resistance to the federal action on marijuana
took considerably longer than state resistance to child labor laws, as the Con-
trolled Substances Act was passed in 1970 and California passed the first state
law legalizing medical marijuana twenty-six years later.216  While the states
eventually acquiesced to the federal position on child labor laws, the oppo-
site has been true regarding medical marijuana laws as states continue to pass
legalizing legislation.217
Both issues involve separation of powers concerns.  But while character-
izing child labor law concerns as pertaining to horizontal separation of pow-
ers would be fair, marijuana legalization concerns the vertical separation of
powers.  The child labor laws can be located in the larger context of the
battle between Congress and the Supreme Court (which eventually involved
President Roosevelt as well) over the reach of Congress’s legislative power.
Marijuana legalization, meanwhile, has not been a battle fought in the courts
but one between the states and the federal government.
Viewing the alignment differently, the situations could be similar in that
both aligned several state government “entities,” and some branches of the
federal government, against another federal branch.218  In the child labor
law conflict, states, Congress, and the President219 united in opposition to
210 Id.
211 Deregulatory insofar as Congress has already regulated marijuana under the Con-
trolled Substances Act, and now the states want those regulations modified to various
degrees.  Deregulation here isn’t meant to be complete, while there may be those who
would remove any restrictions from marijuana altogether, they would likely be a very small
minority.
212 See supra notes 194–96.
213 See supra Section I.A.
214 See supra Section I.B.
215 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 9.
217 See supra Section I.B.
218 Another way to phrase this would be branches of government, but seeing as that is
typically reserved for describing horizontally related branches (executive, legislative, judi-
cial), confusion is avoided.
219 The executive doesn’t seem to have been as involved in the earlier efforts, but
played a role once child labor became a part of the New Deal programs.
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the Supreme Court, which continually declared the congressional acts
unconstitutional.  In the marijuana legalization debate, currently states are
aligned in opposition to Congress (federal law), while the President (and
executive branch) signaled a willingness to allow states to legislate as they see
fit, and the courts are mostly uninvolved.220  Recent congressional action,
such as passing the provision in the 2015 Appropriations Act, could poten-
tially call into question how staunchly Congress is opposed.221  The differ-
ence is that the states began the movement against federal regulation of
marijuana, which seems singular compared to the regulatory development of
child labor laws.
There may also be another, simpler explanation for the unique progres-
sion of marijuana legalization, which is that the political pressures in this
situation are similarly unique.  The state legislatures and governors, being
closer to their constituencies and with more united concerns have been able
to react to the changing public perception of the issue.  Similarly, the Presi-
dent and executive branch, detecting this shift, have also altered their
enforcement to take advantage of the changing public perception.  The fed-
eral legislature, which has passed historically few laws in recent sessions,222
has been unable to take action in accordance with the other political
branches.  This explanation might be unsatisfying, and seem simple, but
sometimes the simplest explanations are best.
CONCLUSION
After surveying the current legal landscape and the state legislation
legalizing both medical and recreational marijuana, several trends and simi-
larities among the states’ stated purposes and intentions emerge.  Examining
the primary source material as a whole demonstrates that with some excep-
tions, states that have legalized either form of marijuana have sought to jus-
tify their decisions on grounds related to the police power.  The evidence
also points to some states accounting for the policies of the federal govern-
ment by emphasizing the strength of their regulations.  Additionally, some
states appear to have anticipated potential preemption challenges to their
laws, and disclaimed any intent to conflict with federal law.  Due to the rela-
220 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), held that Congress was able to regulate medical
marijuana under the Commerce Clause.  However, the Court as has not ruled on the pre-
emptive effect of the CSA, which could provide room for the states to maneuver. See supra
Section I.D.
221 These changes do not seem reflective of the attitude of Congress for much of the
past forty-five years.  Seeing as Congress has not yet come close to voting on a re-scheduling
of marijuana, it remains to be seen how far they are willing to go towards allowing the
states to regulate marijuana for themselves.
222 The 113th Congress enacted the second-fewest laws in history, with 296; the 112th
Congress passed the fewest laws in history, with 283. See Drew DeSilver, In Late Spurt of
Activity, Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress-avoids-least-pro
ductive-title/.
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tively uncertain nature of this area of law, there is potential for rapid change.
A shift in federal policy or a federal court ruling on preemption could alter
the assumptions much of the current system is based upon.  States consider-
ing legalization must weigh the benefits of a strong regulatory framework
that complies with current federal policy but is more likely to be preempted,
and a weaker regulatory framework less likely to be preempted but poten-
tially problematic under current federal policy.  Regardless of how these
unknowns are eventually resolved, the marijuana legalization question has
potential to be one of tremendous importance for the overarching federal-
ism debate and how the federal and state governments will interact moving
forward.
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